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Abstract 
We examine whether and how main central banks responded to episodes of financial stress over 
the last three decades. We employ a new methodology for monetary policy rules estimation, 
which allows for time-varying response coefficients as well as corrects for endogeneity. This 
flexible framework applied to the U.S., U.K., Australia, Canada and Sweden together with a new 
financial stress dataset developed by the International Monetary Fund allows not only testing 
whether the central banks responded to financial stress but also detects the periods and type of 
stress that were the most worrying for monetary authorities and to quantify the intensity of policy 
response. Our findings suggest that central banks often change policy rates: mainly decreasing it 
in the face of high financial stress. However, the size of a policy response varies substantially over 
time as well as across countries, with the 2008-2009 financial crisis being the period of the most 
severe and generalized response. With regards to the specific components of financial stress, 
most central banks seemed to respond to stock market stress and bank stress, while exchange 
rate stress is found to drive the reaction of central banks only in more open economies.  
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1 Introduction 
The recent financial crisis has intensified the interest in exploring the interactions between 
monetary policy and financial stability. Official interest rates were driven sharply to historic lows 
and many unconventional measures were used to pump liquidity into the international financial 
system. Central banks pursued monetary policy under high economic uncertainty coupled with 
large financial shocks in many countries. The financial crisis also raised new challenges for central 
bank policies, in particular how to operationalize the issues related to financial stability for 
monetary policy decision-making (Goodhart, 2006, Borio and Drehmann, 2009).  
 
This paper seeks to analyze whether and how central banks reacted to the periods of financial 
instability, and in particular whether and how the interest-setting process evolved in response to 
financial instability over the last three decades. The monetary policy of central banks is likely to 
react to financial instability in a non-linear way (Goodhart et al., 2009). When a financial system is 
stable, the interest rate setting process largely reflects macroeconomic conditions and financial 
stability considerations enter the monetary policy discussions only to a limited degree. On the 
other hand, central banks may alter its monetary policy to reduce financial imbalances if these 
become severe. In this respect, Mishkin (2010) questions the traditional linear-quadratic 
framework1 when financial markets are disrupted and puts forward the arguments for replacing it 
by nonlinear dynamics, describing the economy and the non-quadratic objective function 
resulting in the non-linear optimal policy.  
 
To deal with the complexity of monetary policy and financial stability nexus as well as to evaluate 
monetary policy in a systematic manner, this paper employs the recently developed time-varying 
parameter estimation of monetary policy rules appropriately accounting for endogeneity in policy 
rules. This flexible framework, together with a new comprehensive financial stress dataset 
developed by the International Monetary Fund, will allow not only testing whether the central 
banks responded to financial stress but also the quantification of the magnitude of this response 
and the detection of the periods and types of stress that were the most worrying for monetary 
authorities.  
 
Although theoretical studies disagree about the role of financial instability for central bank 
interest rate setting policy, our empirical estimates of time-varying monetary policy rules of the 
US Fed, the Bank of England (BoE), Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), Bank of Canada (BoC) 
                                                                                       
1 Linear behavior of the economy and the quadratic objective function of monetary authority. 
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and Sveriges Riksbank (SR) shows that central banks often alter the course of its monetary policy 
in the face of high financial stress, mainly by decreasing their policy rates. However, the size of 
this response varies substantially over time as well as across countries. There is a certain across 
country and time heterogeneity as well when we look at central banks’ consideration of specific 
types of financial stress: Most of them seemed to respond to stock market stress and bank stress, 
and exchange rate stress drives central bank reactions only in more open economies 
 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 describes our 
data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes. An 
appendix with a detailed description of the methodology and additional results follows.  
 
2 Related Literature 
First, this section gives a brief overview of the theory as well as empirical evidence on the 
relationship between monetary policy (rules) and financial instability. Second, it provides a short 
summary of various measures of financial stress. 
 
2.1 Monetary policy (rules) and financial instability – some theories 
 
Financial frictions, such as an unequal access to credits or debt collateralization, were recognized 
to have important consequences for monetary policy transmission and Fisher (1933) has already 
presented the idea that adverse credit-market conditions can cause significant macroeconomic 
disequilibria.  
 
During the last two decades, the effects of monetary policy have been studied mainly within New 
Keynesian (NK) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, which assume the 
existence of nominal rigidities. The common approach to incorporate financial market friction 
within the DSGE framework is to introduce the financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke et al., 
1996, 1999), implying that endogenous developments in credit markets work to amplify and 
propagate shocks to the macroeconomy. Tovar (2009) emphasizes that the major weakness of the 
financial accelerator mechanism is that it only deals with one of many possible financial frictions. 
Goodhart et al. (2009) notes that many NK DSGE models lack the financial sector completely or 
modeled it in a rather embryonic way. Consequently, more recent contributions within this 
stream of literature examined other aspects of financial frictions such as the balance sheets in the 
banking sector (Choi and Cook, 2004), portfolio choice issue with complete (Engel or 
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Matsumoto, 2009) or incomplete markets (Devereux and Sutherland, 2007) or collateral 
constraints (Iacovello and Neri, 2010).2  
 
A few studies focus more specifically on the relationship between the monetary policy stance (or 
the monetary policy rule) and financial stability. However, they do not arrive at a unanimous view 
on whether a monetary policy rule should include some measure of financial stability. Brousseau 
and Detken (2001) present an NK model where a conflict arises between short-term price 
stability and financial stability due to a self-fulfilling belief linking the stability of inflation to the 
smoothness of the interest rate path and suggests that monetary policy should react to financial 
instability. Akram et al. (2007) investigate the macroeconomic implications of pursuing financial 
stability within a flexible inflation-targeting framework. Their model using policy rule, augmented 
with financial stability indicators, shows that the gains of such an augmented rule vis-à-vis the 
rule without financial stability indicators highly depends on the nature of the shocks. Akram and 
Eitrheim (2009) build on the previous framework, finding some evidence that the policy response 
to housing prices, equity prices or credit growth can cause high interest rate volatility and actually 
lower financial stability in terms of indicators that are sensitive to interest rates. Ceccheti and Li 
(2008) show in a static and dynamic setting that a potential conflict between monetary policy and 
financial supervision can be avoided if the interest rate rule takes (procyclical) capital adequacy 
requirements into account, in particular that the policy interest rates are lowered when financial 
stress is high. Bauducco et al. (2008) extends the current benchmark NK model to include 
financial systems and firms that require external financing. Their simulations show that if a 
central bank responds to financial instability by policy easing it achieves better inflation and 
output stabilization in the short term at the cost of greater inflation and output volatility in the 
long term and vice versa. For the US Fed Taylor (2008) proposes a modification of a standard 
Taylor rule to incorporate adjustments to credit spreads. Teranishi (2009) derives a Taylor rule 
augmented by the response to credit spreads as an optimal policy under heterogeneous loan 
interest rate contracts. He finds that the policy response to a credit spread can be both positive 
and negative depending on the financial structure. However, he also puts forward that when 
nominal policy rates are close to zero a commitment rather than discretional policy response is 
the key for reducing the credit spreads. Christiano et al. (2008) suggest augmenting the Taylor 
rule with aggregate private credit and find that such a policy would raise welfare by reducing the 
magnitude of the output fluctuations. Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) develop an NK DSGE 
model with credit frictions to evaluate the performance of alternative policy rules that are 
                                                                                       
2
 The survey of this literature is provided by Tovar (2009). 
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augmented by a response to credit spreads and to aggregate the volume of private credit in the 
face of different shocks. They argue that the response to credit spreads can be welfare improving, 
but the optimal size of such a response is likely rather small. Like Teranishi (2009), they find little 
support for augmenting a Taylor rule by the credit volume given ― that the size and even the sign 
of the desired response is sensitive to the sources of shocks and their persistence ― which is 
information that is not always available during operational policy making. 
 
The related stream of literature focuses on a somewhat narrower issue of whether or not 
monetary policy should respond to asset prices. Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) argue that the 
stabilization of inflation and output provides a substantial contribution to financial stability and 
there are little if any gains to responding to asset prices. Faia and Monacelli (2007) extend the 
model developed by Bernanke and Gertler (2001) by a robust welfare metric confirming that 
strict inflation stabilization offers the best solution. Cecchetti et al. (2000) takes the opposite 
stand arguing that developments in asset markets can have a significant impact on both inflation 
and real economic activity, and central banks might achieve better outcomes considering the asset 
prices provided they are able to detect their misalignments. Borio and Lowe (2002) support this 
view claiming that financial imbalances can build up even in a low inflation environment, which is 
normally favorable to financial stability. The side effect of low inflation is that excess demand 
pressures may first appear in credit aggregates and asset prices rather than consumer prices, 
which are normally considered by the policy makers. Gruen et al. (2005) argues that responding 
to an asset bubble is feasible only when the monetary authority is able to make a correct 
judgment about the process driving the bubble. Roubini (2006) and Posen (2006) provide the 
summary of this debate from a policy perspective. 
 
2.2 Monetary policy (rules) and financial instability – empirical evidence 
The empirical evidence on central banks’ reaction to financial instability is rather scant. Following 
the ongoing debate about whether central banks should respond to asset price volatility (e.g. 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001; Cecchetti et al., 2000; Bordo and Jeanne, 2002), some studies 
tested the response of monetary policy to different asset prices, most commonly to  stock prices 
(Rigobon and Sack, 2003; Siklos and Bohl, 2008; Fuhrer and Tootel, 2008). They find some 
evidence that asset prices either entered the policy information set (because they contain 
information about future inflation) or that some central banks were directly trying to offset its 
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disequilibria.3 All these papers estimate time-invariant policy rules, which means that they test a 
permanent response to these variables. However, it seems more plausible that if central banks 
respond to asset prices, they do it only when their misalignments are substantial, in other words 
their response is asymmetric. There are two additional controversies related to the effects of asset 
prices on monetary policy decisions: (i) The first concerns the measure, in particular whether the 
stock market index that is typically employed is sufficiently representative or whether some other 
assets, in particular the housing prices, should be considered as well, and (ii) the second issue is 
related to the (even ex-post) identification of the asset price misalignment. Finally, it is likely that 
the perception of misalignments is influenced by general economic conditions and that a possible 
response could evolve over time. Detken and Smets (2004) summarize some stylized facts on 
macroeconomic and monetary policy developments during asset price booms. Overall they find 
that monetary policy was significantly looser during the high-cost booms that were marked by the 
investment and real estate prices crash in the post-boom periods. 
 
A few empirical studies measure monetary policy response using broader measures of financial 
imbalances. Borio and Lowe (2004) estimate the response of four central banks (Reserve Bank of 
Australia, Bundesbank, Bank of Japan and the US Fed) to imbalances proxied by the ratio of 
private sector credit to GDP, inflation-adjusted equity prices and their composite. They find 
either negative or ambiguous evidence for all countries except for the USA confirming that the 
Fed responded to financial imbalances in an asymmetric and reactive way, i.e. that the federal 
fund rate was disproportionally lowered in the face of imbalance unwinding but it was not 
tightened beyond normal as imbalances built up. Ceccheti and Li (2008) estimate a Taylor rule 
augmented by a measure of banking stress, in particular a deviation of leverage ratios (total loans 
to the sum of equity and subordinated debt; total assets to the sum of bank capital and reserves) 
from its Hodrick-Prescott trend. They find some evidence that the Fed adjusted the interest rate 
in order to counteract the procyclical impact of a bank’s capital requirements, while the 
Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan did not. Bulíř and Čihák (2008) estimate the monetary policy 
response to seven alternative measures of financial sector vulnerability (crisis probability, time to 
crisis, distance to default or credit default swap spreads) in a panel of 28 countries. Their 
empirical framework is different in the sense that the monetary policy stance is proxied along the 
short-term interest rate by measures of domestic liquidity and external shocks are controlled for. 
In the panel setting, they find a statistically significant negative response to many variables 
representing vulnerability (policy easing) but surprisingly not in country-level regressions. Belke 
                                                                                       
3
 A similar but somewhat less polemic debate applies to the role of the exchange rate, especially for small open 
economies (Taylor, 2001). 
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and Klose (2010) investigate the factors behind the interest rate decision of the ECB and the Fed 
during the current crisis. They conclude that the estimated policy rule was significantly altered 
only for the Fed and they put forward that the ECB gave greater weight on inflation stabilization 
at the cost of some output loss. 
 
2.3 Measures of financial stress 
The incidence and determinants of different types of crises have been typically traced in the 
literature by a means of narrative evidence (expert judgment). This was sometimes complemented 
with selected indicators (the exchange rate devaluation, the state of foreign reserves) that point to 
historical regularities (e.g. Eichengreen and Bordo, 2002; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Reinhart 
and Rogoff, 2009; Laeven and Valencia, 2008). The empirical studies (e.g. Goldstein et al., 2000) 
used binary variables that were constructed based on these narratives.  
 
Consequently, some contributions strived to provide more data-driven measures of financial 
stress. Most of the existing stress indices are based on high-frequency data but they differ in the 
selected variables (bank capitalization, credit ratings, credit growth, interest rate spreads or 
volatility of different asset classes), country coverage and the aggregation method. An important 
advantage of continuous stress indicators is that it may reveal periods of small-scale stress that 
did not result in full-blown crisis and were neglected in studies based on binary crisis variables. 
   
The Bank Credit Analyst (BCA) reports a monthly financial stress index (FSI) for the USA that is 
based on the performance of banking shares as compared to whole stock market, credit spreads 
and the slope of the yield curve, and the new issues of stocks, bonds and consumer confidence. 
JP Morgan calculates a Liquidity, Credit and Volatility Index (LCVI) based on seven variables: the 
US Treasury curve error (standard deviation of the spread between on-the-run and off-the-run 
US Treasury bills and bonds along the entire maturity curve), the 10-year US swap spread, US 
high-yield spreads, JP Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index, foreign exchange volatility 
(weighted average of 12-month implied volatilities of several currencies), the Chicago Board of 
Exchange equity volatility index VIX, and the JP Morgan Global Risk Appetite Index. 
 
Illing and Liu (2006) develop a comprehensive FSI for Canada. Their underlying data covers 
equity, bond and foreign exchange markets as well as the banking sector. They use a standard 
measure and refined measure of each stress component, where the former refers to the variables 
and their transformations that are commonly found in the literature, while the latter incorporates 
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the adjustments that allow for better extraction of the information about stressful periods. They 
explore different weighting schemes to aggregate the individual series (factor analysis, size of a 
corresponding market on total credit in economy, variance-equal weighting). At last, they 
perform an expert survey to identify periods that were perceived as especially stressful, 
confirming that the FSI matches these episodes very well.  
 
Carlson et al. (2008) propose for the Fed Board of Governors a framework similar to the option 
pricing model (Merton, 1974) that aims to provide a distance-to-default of the financial system, 
the so-called Index of Financial Health. The method uses the difference between the market 
value of a firm’s assets and liabilities and the volatility of the asset’s value in order to measure the 
proximity of a firm’s assets being exceeded by its liabilities. They apply this measure to 25 of the 
largest US financial institutions, confirming its impact on capital investments in the US economy. 
The FED of Kansas City developed the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (Hakkio and Keeton, 
2009) that is published monthly and is based on eleven variables (seven spreads between different 
bond classes by issuers, risk profiles and maturities, correlations between returns on stocks and 
Treasury bonds, expected volatility of overall stock prices, volatility of bank stock prices and a 
cross-section dispersion of bank stock returns) that are aggregated by principal component 
analysis.  
 
Finally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently published financial stress indices for 
various countries. Cardarelli et al. (2009) propose a comprehensive index based on high-
frequency data where the price changes are measured with respect to its previous levels or trend 
value. The underlying variables are standardized and aggregated into a single index (FSI) using 
variance-equal weighting for each country and period. The FSI has three subcomponents: the 
banking sector (the slope of the yield curve, TED spread, the beta of banking sector stock), 
securities markets (corporate bonds spread, stock market returns and time-varying volatility of 
stock returns) and exchange rate (time-varying volatility of NEER changes). Balaskrishnan et al. 
(2009) modify the previous index to account for specific conditions of emerging economies; on 
one hand including the measure of exchange rate pressures (currency depreciation and decline in 
foreign reserves) and sovereign debt spread, on the other hand downplaying the banking sector 
measures (slope of the yield curve and TED spread).4 We will use the former index given its 
comprehensiveness as well as its availability for different countries (see more details below). 
 
                                                                                       
4
 The IMF Financial Stress Index has been recently applied by Melvin and Taylor (2009) to analyze the exchange rate 
crises. 
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3 Data and Empirical Methodology  
 
3.1 The dataset 
We use monthly data (quarterly for Sweden and Canada, more details below). The sample period 
slightly varies due to data availability (the US 1981:1 M – 2009:6M; the UK 1981:1M -2009:3M; 
Australia 1983:3M – 2009:5M; Canada 1981:1Q – 2008:4Q; Sweden 1984:2Q – 2009:1Q). 
 
The dependent variable is typically the interest rate closely related to the official (censored) policy 
rate, in particular the federal fund rate (3M) for the USA, the discount rate (3-month treasury 
bills) for the UK, Canada and Sweden, and the 3-month RBA accepted bills rate for Australia. It 
is evident that policy rate is not necessarily the only instrument that the central bank uses, 
especially during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis when many unconventional measures were 
implemented (see Borio and Disyatat, 2009; Reis, 2010). So as to address this issue in terms of 
estimated policy rules, for robustness check we use the interbank interest rate (at a maturity of 3 
months). While both rates are used in empirical papers on the monetary policy rules estimation 
without great controversy, the selection of the interest rate turns more delicate during financial 
stress periods (Taylor, 2008). While the former is more directly affected by genuine monetary 
policy decisions (carried by open market operations), the latter additionally includes liquidity 
conditions on the interbank markets and as such can be affected by some unconventional 
policies, though these are usually insulated (often intentionally) from policy interest rates.5 This 
represents a drawback but also a potential advantage of this alternative dependent variable. On 
the one hand, the changes in official policy rate may not fully pass through into interbank interest 
rates, in particular when the perceived counterparty risk is too high and the credit spreads widen 
(see Taylor and Williams, 2009). On the other hand the interbank rate may also incorporate the 
impact of policy actions such as quantitative easing aimed to supply additional liquidity into the 
system.6  
                                                                                       
5
 Borio and Disyatat (2009) characterize the unconventional policies as policies that affect the central bank’s balance 
sheet size and composition and that can be insulated from the interest rate policy (so-called “decoupling principle”). 
One common example of such a policy (not necessarily used during the time of crisis) is a sterilized exchange rate 
intervention. Given that we aim not for a single episode of stress but rather want to identify whether monetary 
authorities deviated from its systematic pattern (the policy rule) during these periods (by responding to indicators of 
financial stress), we need to use a consistent measure of policy actions that are adjusted during the periods of 
financial stress, though other measures can be in place as well. Therefore, we assume that the monetary policy stance 
is fully reflected in the interest rate, and we are aware that it might be subject to a downward bias on the financial 
stress coefficient. The reader may want to interpret our results on the importance of financial stress on interest rate 
setting as a conservative estimate. 
6
 There are other policy measures that can be used as a reactive or pre-emptive response to financial stress such as 
regulatory or administrative measures, although their effects are likely to appear only in the longer term and cannot 
be reasonably included in our empirical analysis. 
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The inflation is measured as a year-on-year change of CPI, apart from the United States where we 
use the personal consumption expenditures price index (PCE) and Sweden where the underlying 
inflation CPIX (excludes households’ mortgage interest expenditure and the direct effects of 
changes in indirect taxes and subsidies from the CPI) is used.7 The output gap is proxied by the 
gap of the seasonally adjusted industrial production index derived by the Hodrick-Prescott filter 
with smoothing parameter set to 14400. For Sweden and Canada, where we use quarterly data, 
the output gap was taken as reported in the OECD Economic Outlook (production function 
method based on NAWRU ― non-accelerating wages rate of unemployment). 
 
We proxy the financial stress by means of the FSI provided recently by the IMF (Cardarelli et al., 
2009), which is a consistent measure for a wide range of countries but at the same time is 
comprehensive enough to track stress of a different nature. It includes the main components of 
financial stress in an economy and is available for a reasonably long period to be used for our 
empirical analysis (see Figure 1). We use both the overall index, which is a sum of seven 
components, as well as each sub-index and component separately:  
• (i) Banking-related sub-index components: the inverted term spread (the difference 
between short-term and long-term government bonds), TED spread (the difference 
between interbank rates and the yield on treasury bills), banking beta (12-month rolling 
beta, which is a measure of the correlation of banking stock returns to total returns in line 
with the CAPM);  
• (ii) Securities-markets related sub-index components: corporate bond spread (the 
difference between corporate bonds and long-term government bond yields), stock 
markets returns (monthly returns multiplied by -1), time-varying stock return volatility 
from the GARCH(1,1) model, and  
• (iii) Foreign exchange related sub-index: the time-varying volatility of monthly changes in 
NEER, from the GARCH (1,1) model.  
We have examined the various alternative methods of aggregating the components: simple sum, 
variance-equal weighting, and PCA weighting, but failed to uncover any systematic differences 
among these in terms of the values of the overall index and consecutively in the empirical results. 
 
                                                                                       
7 For Australia, the monthly CPI is not available because both the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics only publish quarterly data. The monthly series was obtained using a linear interpolation of the 
CPI index. 
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The use of a composite index has a number of benefits. First, it approximates the evolution of 
financial stress caused by different factors and thus it is not limited to one specific type of 
instability. Second, the inclusion of additional variables into the stress index does not affect the 
evolution of the indicator markedly (Cardarelli et al., 2009). Third, the composition of the 
indicator allows breaking down the reactions of the central bank with respect to different stress 
sub-components. Nevertheless, one has to be cautious about the interpretation. The composite 
indicator might suggest a misleading interpretation as long as the stress is caused by variables not 
included within the FSI but rather are highly correlated with some sub-component. An example 
is the case of Sweden during the ERM crisis. At the time of the crisis, Sweden maintained a fixed 
exchange rate and Riksbank sharply increased interest rates in order to sustain the parity. 
However, this is not captured by the exchange rate sub-component of the FSI, which measures 
the exchange rate volatility, because the volatility was actually close to zero. A closer look at the 
data shows that this period of stress is captured by the inverted term structure; hence it is 
incorrectly attributed to bank stress. A similar pattern can be observed for the UK, where the FSI 
increases after the announcement of the withdrawal from the ERM. 
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Figure 1 – IMF Financial Stress Indicator 
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Note: The figure presents the evolution of the IMF stress index over time. Higher numbers 
indicate more stress (see Cardarelli et al., 2009). 
 
3.2 The empirical model 
Following Clarida et al. (1998, 2000), most empirical studies assume that the central bank sets the 
nominal interest rate in line with the state of the economy typically in a forward-looking manner:  
                                 ( )* *t t i t t i t j tr r E E yβ pi pi γ+ + + = +  Ω  − + Ω                            (1) 
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where *tr  denotes the targeted interest rate, r is the policy neutral rate
8, t ipi +  stands for the 
central bank forecast of the yearly inflation rate i indicates periods ahead based on an information 
set tΩ  used for  interest rate decision available at time t, and 
*
t i
pi
+
 is the central bank’s inflation 
target.9 t jy +  represents a measure of the output gap.  
 
Nevertheless, Eq. (1) was found to be too restrictive to provide a reasonable description of actual 
interest rate setting. Notably it does not account for the interest rate smoothing of central banks, 
in particular the practice when the central bank adjusts the interest rate sluggishly to the targeted 
value. This is in empirical studies tracked by the simple partial-adjustment mechanism: 
                                                         ( ) *1 1t t tr r rρ ρ−= + −                                                  (2) 
where [ ]0,1ρ ∈  is the smoothing parameter. There is an ongoing controversy as to whether this 
parameter represents genuine policy inertia or reflects empirical problems related to omitted 
variables, dynamics or shocks (see e.g. Rudebusch, 2006). The linear policy rule in Eq. (1) can be 
obtained as the optimal monetary policy rule in the LQ framework where the central bank aims 
only at price stability and economic activity. Bauducco et al. (2008) propose an NK model with a 
financial system where the monetary policy has privileged information (given its supervisory 
function) on the health of the financial sector. In such a setting, the common policy rule 
represented by Eq. (1) shall be augmented by variables representing the health of the financial 
sector. Following this contribution we consider the forward-looking rule where central banks 
may respond to a comprehensive measure of financial stress rather than stress in a particular 
segment (Bulíř and Čihák, 2008). Therefore, we substitute Eq. (2) into Eq. (1), eliminate 
unobserved forecast variables, pass the inflation forecast to the generic intercept α and include 
measures of the financial stress described above, which results in Eq. (3): 
                  ( ) 11t t i t j t t k tr y r xρ α βpi γ ρ δ ε+ + − + = − + + + + +                  (3) 
While in Eq. (1) the term α coincides with the policy neutral rate r , its interpretation is not 
straightforward in our case. First, it is time varying as it encompass both changes in equilibrium 
real interest rate and inflation target. Second, the empirical model is augmented by an additional 
variable, the measure of financial stress. Note that the financial stress index t kx +  does not appear 
within the square brackets because it is not a variable that determines the target interest rate *tr  
                                                                                       
8 A policy-neutral rate is typically defined as the sum of the real equilibrium rate and expected inflation. 
9 An explicit definition of an inflation target exists only for countries with an inflation targeting (IT) regime. Most 
empirical studies assume, in line with Taylor (1993), that this target does not vary in time and can be omitted in the 
empirical model. 
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but it is rather a factor such as the lagged interest rate, i.e. it may explain why the actual interest 
rate tr  deviates from the target. Moreover, placing it in the regression on the same level as a 
lagged interest rate, we can directly test whether this variable representing ad-hoc policy decisions 
decreases the interest rate inertia ρ  as suggested by Mishkin (2009). The common logic also 
suggest that the coefficients ρ  and δ  shall move in the opposite direction because the central 
bank either smoothes the interest rate changes or adjusts the rates in the face of financial stress. 
In the latter case, the response is likely to be quick and substantial. We set i equal to 2, j equal to 0 
and k equal to -1.10 Consequently, the disturbance term tε  is a combination of forecast errors 
and is thus orthogonal to all information available at time t ( tΩ ).  
 
The empirical studies on monetary policy rules have moved from using time-invariant estimates 
(Clarida et al., 1998) through sub-sample analysis (Taylor, 1999, Clarida et al., 2000) towards more 
complex methods that allow an assessment of the evolution in the conduct of monetary policy. 
There are two alternative methods to modeling structural changes in monetary policy rules that 
occur on an unknown date: (i) regime switching models, in particular the state-dependent Markov 
switching models (Valente, 2003; Assenmacher-Wesche, 2006; Sims and Zha 2006) and (ii) state-
space models, where the changes are characterized by smooth transitions rather than abrupt 
switches (Boivin, 2006; Elkhoury, 2006; Kim and Nelson, 2006; Trecrocci and Vasalli, 2009). As 
argued in Baxa et al. (2010), we consider the second approach as preferable for the estimation of 
policy rules given that it is more flexible and allows the incorporation of a simple correction of 
endogeneity (Kim, 2006; Kim and Nelson, 2006), which is a major issue in forward-looking 
policy rules estimated from ex-post data.11 The state-space approach or time-varying coefficient 
model seems also suitable when one wants to evaluate the effect of factors such as financial stress 
that can, for a limited length of time, alter (rather than permanently change) the monetary policy 
conduct.  
                                                                                       
10 Although the targeting horizon of central banks is usually longer (4-8 quarters), we prefer to proxy inflation 
expectations by inflation in t+2 for the following reasons: First, the endogeneity correction requires a strong 
correlation between the endogenous regressor and its instruments. Second, the prediction error logically increases in 
longer horizons. In case of the output gap, we instead assume a backward-looking reaction. The reason is that in the 
absence of real time data we have to rely on the output gap construction of statistical methods. It is arguable that 
besides the prediction error there is also a construction error that both might be magnified if an unobserved forecast 
is substituted by the output gap estimate for future periods. At last, we assume that central bankers’ response (if any) 
to financial stress is rather immediate (see Mishkin, 2009). Therefore, we use one lag of the FSI and its 
subcomponents in the benchmark case. However, as a robustness check we allow for different lags and leads, 
allowing the central bankers’ response to be preemptive rather than reactive. 
11 The time-varying parameter model with the specific treatment of endogeneity is still relevant when real-time data 
are used (Orphanides, 2001). When the real-time forecast is not derived under the assumption that nominal interest 
rates will remain constant within the forecasting horizon (Boivin, 2006) or in the case of measurement error and 
heteroscedasticity (Kim et al., 2006). 
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The state-space models are commonly estimated by means of a maximum likelihood estimator 
via the Kalman filter or smoother. Unfortunately, this approach has several limitations that can 
turn problematic in applied work. First, the results are somewhat sensitive to the initial values of 
the parameters, which are usually unknown, especially in the case of variables whose impact on 
the dependent variable is not permanent and whose size is unknown, which is the case of 
financial stress and its effect on interest rates. Second, the log likelihood function is highly 
nonlinear and in some cases, optimization algorithms fail to minimize the negative of the log 
likelihood. In particular, it can either fail to calculate the Hessian matrix throughout the iterations 
process or, when the likelihood function is approximated to facilitate computations, covariance 
matrix of observation vector can get singular for provided starting values.  The alternative is a 
moment-based estimator proposed by Schlicht (1981, 2005) and Schlicht and Ludsteck (2006), 
which is employed in our paper and briefly described below. This framework is flexible enough 
so as to incorporate the endogeneity correction proposed by Kim (2006). 
  
Kim (2006) shows that the conventional time-varying parameter model delivers inconsistent 
estimates when explanatory variables are correlated with the disturbance term and proposes an 
estimator of the time-varying coefficient model with endogenous regressors. The endogeneity 
may arise not only in forward-looking policy rules based on ex-post data (Kim and Nelson, 2006, 
Baxa et al., 2010), but also in the case of variables that have a two-sided relation with monetary 
policy. Financial stress unquestionably enters this category. Following Kim (2006) we rewrite Eq. 
3 as follows:  
                  ( ) 11t t t t t i t t j t t t t k tr y r xρ α β pi γ ρ δ ε+ + − + = − + + + + +                             (4) 
                                              1 1,t t tα α ϑ−= + , ( )121, ~ . . . 0,t i i d N ϑϑ σ                                             (5) 
                                             1 2,t t tβ β ϑ−= + , ( )222, ~ . . . 0,t i i d N ϑϑ σ                                             (6) 
                                             1 3,t t tγ γ ϑ−= + , ( )323, ~ . . . 0,t i i d N ϑϑ σ                                              (7) 
                                              1 4,t t tδ δ ϑ−= + , ( )424, ~ . . . 0,t i i d N ϑϑ σ                                             (8) 
                                             1 5,t t tρ ρ ϑ−= + , ( )525, ~ . . . 0,t i i d N ϑϑ σ                                             (9) 
                                             't i t m tZ ϕpi ξ σ ϕ+ −= + , ( )~ . . . 0,1t i i d Nϕ                                         (10) 
                                             't j t m ty Z νψ σ ν+ −= + , ( )~ . . . 0,1t i i d Nν                                         (11) 
                                            't k t m tx Z ιο σ ι+ −= + , ( )~ . . . 0,1t i i d Nι                                             (12) 
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The measurement Eq. (4) of the state-space representation is the monetary policy rule. The 
transitions in Eqs. (5)-(9) describes the time-varying coefficients as a random walk process 
without drift.12 Eqs. (10)-(12) track the relationship between the potentially endogenous 
regressors ( it+pi , t jy +  and t kx + ) and their instruments, tZ . We use the following instruments: 
1−tpi , 12tpi − ( 4tpi − for CAN and SWE), 1ty − , 2ty − , 1−tr , and when k≥ 0 also 1tx −  and 2tx − ). 
Following Kim (2006), we assume that the parameters in Eqs. (10)-(12) are time-invariant. The 
correlation between the standardized residuals tϕ , tν and tζ   and the error term tε  is εϕκ , , ενκ ,  
and 
,ζ εκ  respectively (note that ϕσ , νσ , and ζσ  are the standard errors of tϕ , tν  and tζ , 
respectively). The consistent estimates of the coefficients in Eq. (4) are obtained in two steps. In 
the first step, we estimate Eqs. (10)-(12) and save the standardized residuals tϕ , tν  and tζ . In the 
second step, we estimate Eq. (13) below along with Eqs. (5)-(9). Note that Eq. (13) now includes 
bias correction terms, i.e. (standardized) residuals from Eqs. (10)-(12), to address the 
aforementioned endogeneity of the regressors. Consequently, the estimated parameters in Eq. 
(13) are consistent, as tε  is uncorrelated with the regressors. 
( )[ ]2 1 1 11t t t t t t t t t t t ,ε ε,t t ν,ε ε t ,ε ε t tr pi y r x κ σ κ σ ν κ σζ ϕρ α β γ ρ δ ζ ϕ ζ+ − − −= − + + + + + + + +
 
,  ( )2 2 2 2, , , ,~ 0, (1 )t v tN ε ϕ ε ι ε εζ κ κ κ σ− − −                                                                                 (13) 
As we noted before, instead of the standard framework for second-step estimation, the maximum 
likelihood estimator via the Kalman filter (Kim, 2006), we use an alternative estimation 
framework, the “varying coefficients” (VC) method (Schlicht, 1981; Schlicht, 2005; Schlicht and 
Ludsteck, 2006). This method is a generalization of the ordinary least squares approach that, 
instead of minimizing the sum of the squares of residuals 2
1
T
t=
ε∑ , uses the minimization of the 
weighted sum of squares: 
                                     
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2 n n
1 1 1 1
T T T T
t= t= t= t=
+ θ +θ + θζ ϑ ϑ ϑ… +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑                             (14) 
where the weights iθ  are the inverse variance ratios of the regression residuals tζ  and the shocks 
in time-varying coefficients tϑ , that is 2 2/i iθ = σ σ . This approach balances the fit of the model 
and the parameter stability. Additionally, the time averages of the regression coefficients, 
estimated by a weighted least squares estimator, are identical to their GLS estimates of the 
                                                                                       
12 Note that while a typical time-invariant regression assumes that 
1t t
a a −= , in this case it is assumed that 
[ ]
1t t
E a a −= .  
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corresponding regression with fixed coefficients, that is 
1
1
ˆ ˆ
T
t GLS
t=
a = a
T ∑
.13 The method is useful in 
our case because:  
• (i) it does not require knowledge of initial values even for non-stationary variables prior to 
the estimation procedure. Instead, both the variance ratios and the coefficients are 
estimated simultaneously,  
• (ii) the property of the estimator, that the time averages of estimated time-varying 
coefficients are equal to its time-invariant counterparts, permits the easy interpretation of 
the results in relation to time-invariant results,  
• (iii) it coincides with the MLE estimator via the Kalman filter if the time series are 
sufficiently long and if the variance ratios are properly estimated.14  
 
However, this method suffers certain limitations of its own. In particular: (a) it requires that the 
time-varying coefficients are described as random walks and (b) the shocks in time-varying 
coefficients tϑ  are minimized (see Eq. (14)). While this does not represent a major problem for 
the estimation of the coefficients of common variables such as inflation, where the monetary 
policy response is permanent, it can lead to a loss of some information about ad-hoc response 
factors in monetary policy-making that are considered by central bankers only infrequently but 
once they are in place the policy response can be substantial. A financial stress indicator t kx +  
seems to be this kind of factor. The way to deal with this problem is the estimation-independent 
calibration of the variance ratios in Eq. (14) such that the estimated coefficient is consistent with 
economic logic, i.e. it is mostly insignificant and it can turn significant (with no prior restriction 
on its sign) during the periods of financial stress, i.e. when the financial stress indicator is 
different from zero. Therefore, we first estimate Eq. (13) using the VC method first and study 
whether the resulting coefficients at the FSI correspond to economic intuition, and especially 
whether the coefficient is not constant or slowly moving (a so-called pile-up problem, see Stock 
and Watson, 1998). When this problem occurs, we compare the results with models where k 
belongs to (-2, -1, 0, 1, 2) and calibrates the variance ratios in Eq. (13) by the variance ratios 
                                                                                       
13
 See Schlicht and Ludsteck (2006) and Baxa et al. (2010) for more details. 
14 The Kalman filter as implemented in common econometric packages typically uses the diffusion of priors for its 
initiation but it still produces a lot of corner solutions and often it does not achieve convergence. Schlicht and 
Ludsteck (2006) compare the performance of the moment estimator and the Kalman smoother in terms of the mean 
squared error on simulated data and they conclude that the moment estimator outperforms the Kalman filter on 
small samples with a size of up to 100 observations. For comparison, we estimated Eq. (13) using the conventional 
Kalman filter in the GROCER software using the function tvp (Dubois-Michaux, 2009). We parameterized the 
model by initial conditions taken from the OLS estimates of the parameters on the full sample and the initial forecast 
error covariance matrix set to 0. The matrix of the residuals of time-varying coefficients is assumed to be diagonal 
like in the VC method. The results were very similar to those obtained from the VC method when the estimated 
variances were the same in both methods. 
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estimated for the model with the largest variances in the FSI. This step was necessary for 
Australia and Sweden. The Taylor rule coefficients were compared with the initial estimates and 
they were consistent in both cases.15 
 
The results of our empirical analysis should reveal whether central banks adjusted its interest rate 
policy in the face of financial stress. However, the time-varying framework also allows inferring 
whether any response to financial stress led to the temporal dismissal of other targets, in 
particular the inflation rate. Therefore, we are mainly interested in the evolution of the financial 
stress coefficient tδ . We expect it to be mostly insignificant or zero given that episodes of 
financial stress are rather infrequent and even if they occur the monetary authorities may not 
always respond to them. Moreover, the size of the estimated coefficient does not have any 
obvious interpretation since the FSI is a composite indicator normalized to have a zero mean. 
Consequently, we define the stress effect as a product of the estimated coefficient tδ  and the 
value of IMF financial stress index t kx + . The interpretations of the stress effect is 
straightforward: it shows the magnitude of interest rate reactions to financial stress in percentage 
points or, in other words, the deviation from the target interest rate as implied by the 
macroeconomic variables due to the response to financial stress. 
 
4 Results 
This section summarizes our results on the effect of financial stress on interest rate setting. First, 
the results on the effect of the overall measure of financial stress on interest rate setting are 
presented. Second, the effect of specific components of financial stress on monetary policy is 
examined. Third, we briefly comment on the monetary policy rule estimates that served as the 
input for the assessment of financial stress effects. Finally, we perform a series of robustness 
checks. 
 
Figure 2 presents our results on the effect of financial stress on interest rate setting in all five 
countries (labeled as financial stress effect hereinafter). Although there is some heterogeneity across 
countries, some global trends on the effect of financial stress are apparent. While in good times, 
such as in the second half of the 1990s, financial stress has virtually no effect on interest rate 
                                                                                       
15
 Stock and Watson (1998) propose a medium unbiased estimator for variance in the time-varying parameter model 
but its application is straightforward only in the case of one time-varying coefficient and, more importantly, it 
requires the variables being stationary.  
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setting or it is slightly positive,16 the reaction of monetary authorities to financial stress was highly 
negative during the 2008-2009 global financial crisis. While the previous evidence on the effect of 
financial stress on monetary policy is somewhat limited, our results broadly confirm the time-
invariant findings of Cecchetti and Li (2008), which show that the US Fed adjusted the interest 
rates to the procyclical impact of bank capital requirements in 1989-2000. Similarly, Belke and 
Klose (2010) estimate the Taylor rule on two sub-samples (before and during the 2008-2009 
global financial crisis) and find that the Fed reacted systematically not only to inflation and output 
gap, but to asset prices, credit and money as well. 
                                                                                       
16
 Note that the positive effect of financial stress on interest rate setting is to some extent a consequence of scaling 
the financial stress indicator; its zero value corresponds to a long run average stress. Hence, we do not place much 
attention onto the positive values of stress unless caused by the temporarily positive and significant regression 
coefficient associated with the FSI. 
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Figure 2 – The Effect of Financial Stress on Interest Rate Setting 
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Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of the financial stress effect. The stress effect (y-axis) is 
defined as the product of the estimated coefficient on the financial stress indicator in monetary 
policy rule and the value of the IMF financial stress indicator. The stress effect shows the 
magnitude of the interest rate reaction to financial stress in percentage points. 
 
The size of financial stress effects on interest rate setting during the recent financial crisis is 
somewhat heterogeneous with the strongest reaction found for the UK The results suggest that 
all central banks, except the Bank of England, kept its policy rates by about 50-100 basis points 
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lower, as compared to the counterfactual of no reaction to financial stress. The size of this effect 
for the UK is assessed to be about three times stronger (i.e. 250 basis points). This implies that 
about 50 percent of the overall policy rate decreased during the recent financial crisis was 
motivated by the financial stability concerns in the UK (10-30 percent in the remaining sample 
countries), while the remaining half falls on unfavorable developments in domestic economic 
activity. This finding is interesting when confronted with the BoE’s very low consideration of 
expected inflation over the last decade (found Baxa et al., 2010, using the time-varying model and 
in Taylor and Davradakis, 2006, in the context of the threshold model) that further decreased 
during the current crisis similarly as for the USA but less so for the other central banks. It is also 
evident that the magnitude of the response is unusual for all five central banks. Yet, the results 
for Australia, Canada and Sweden show that a similar magnitude of the response to financial 
stress recorded during the recent financial crisis was already seen in previous periods of high 
financial stress.  
 
Given that the 2008-2009 global crisis occurred right at the end of our sample (there is a peak in 
the stress indicator of 5 standard deviations that has not returned to normal values yet), we have 
performed an additional check to avoid possible end-point bias. In particular, we have run our 
estimation excluding the observation from the period of 2008-2009 crisis: These results (are 
available upon request) confirmed the robustness of the reported findings. With regards to the 
effect of the current crisis, the largest uncertainty is associated with the results for Canada, for 
which the shortest data sample was available, and it ends in the fourth quarter of 2008. When the 
possibility of a preemptive reaction of the central bank to financial stress is considered, the effect 
of financial stress in the current crisis is somewhere at 1-2 percent (see Appendix 3). These 
additional results suggest the response of the Bank of Canada is rather underestimated. 
 
The question of which components of financial stress influence interest rate setting is addressed 
in Figure 3. Some heterogeneity across countries is again apparent; although it seems that bank 
stress and stock market stress dominated the central bankers in less open economies. On the 
other hand, exchange rate stress matters in more open economies such as Canada and Sweden. 
 
More specifically, the US Fed seemed to be worried about financial instability, especially during 
the 1980s. We can see that the main concern in the early 1980s was banking stress, which is 
arguably related to the Savings and Loans crisis. Another concern was that of stock market stress 
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in particular during the stock market crash of 1987 when interest rates were lower by 30 b.p. with 
respect to the benchmark case.  
 
The Bank of England was, in general, much more perceptive to financial stress. We find its 
response mainly to stock market stress again notably in 1987. Interestingly, we find little response 
to exchange rate stress, not even during the 1992 ERM crisis. Nevertheless, it has to be 
emphasized that the interest rate reaction to speculative attack was subdued in comparison to, for 
example, the Riksbank (Buiter et al., 1998). The coefficient at the FSI remains constant until the 
devaluation of the pound sterling in September 1992. Since then the effect of financial stress on 
interest rate setting approaches zero from originally negative values. Besides this, the response of 
the Bank of England to inflation has decreased. From this perspective, it seems the pound 
sterling’s withdrawal from the ERM allowed for both a more rule-based and less restrictive 
monetary policy.  
 
The reaction of the Riksbank to the ERM crisis was different. First, after a series of speculative 
attacks on the Swedish krona in mid-September 1992, the Riksbank still tried to keep the current 
fixed exchange rate in place and the marginal interest rate jumped up 500 percent in order to 
offset the outflow of liquidity and other speculative attacks (see the large positive stress effect on 
the interest rate in 1992 in Figure 2). However, not even such an increase was sufficient and the 
fixed exchange rate had to be abandoned later in November. 17  
 
The Reserve Bank of Australia significantly loosened its policy during the 1980s, which can be 
attributed to the stress in the banking sector with an exception of the reaction to the stock 
market crash in 1987 (see Figure 3).  
 
The exchange rate as well as bank stress seems to matter for interest rate considerations at the 
Bank of Canada. Interestingly, the results suggest that the Bank of Canada often responded to 
higher exchange rate stress by monetary tightening. A possible explanation for this finding could 
be that the Canadian central bank tightened the policy when the currency stabilized at the level 
that the monetary authority considered to be undervalued. 
                                                                                       
17 For Sweden, we add a dummy variable for the third quarter of 1992 (ERM crisis) to Eq. 13. At this time the 
Swedish central bank forced upward short-term interest rates in an effort to keep the krona within the ERM. From 
the perspective of our model, it was a case of a strong positive reaction to the actual stress that lasted only one 
period. When this dummy variable was not included, the model with a lagged value of the FSI was unable to show 
any link between stress and the interest and estimates of other coefficients were inconsistent with economic 
intuition. 
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We would like to highlight a comparison of Figures 2 and 3. First, it should be noted that the 
positive response to one stress subcomponent may cancel out against a negative response to 
another one, making the response to the overall stress negligible (as in the case of Canada). 
Second, the stress effects related to individual subcomponents need not necessarily sum up to the 
stress effect related to the entire FSI.  
 
All in all, the results suggest that the central bank tends to react to financial stress and different 
components of financial stress matter in different time periods. The effect of financial stress on 
interest rate setting is found to be virtually zero in good times and economically sizable during 
the period of high financial stress.  
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Figure 3 – The Effect of Financial Stress Components on Interest Rate Setting: 
Bank Stress, Exchange Rate Stress and Stock Market Stress 
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Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of the components of the financial stress effect, namely 
bank stress effect, exchange rate stress effect and stock market stress effect. The stress effect (y-
axis) is defined as the product of the estimated coefficient on the given component of the 
financial stress indicator in monetary policy rule and the value of the corresponding component 
of the IMF financial stress indicator. The stress effect shows the magnitude of the interest rate 
reaction to financial stress in percentage points. 
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Next, we briefly comment on our monetary policy rule estimates. The plot of the evolution of 
estimated parameters over time for all countries is available in Appendix 1. First, these results 
indicate that the interest rate smoothing is much lower than what time-invariant estimates of 
monetary policy rules typically suggest (see for example, Clarida et al., 1998, 2000). Our estimates 
of interest rate smoothing seem to be reasonable given the recent critique of Rudebush (2006), 
who argues that the degree of interest rate smoothing is rather low. Moreover, for some central 
banks such as the RBA and the BoE in 2010 or the Sveriges Riksbank in late 1980 we find 
support for Mishkin’s (2009, 2010) argument that central banks are less inertial during the crisis.18 
Second, the response of interest rates on inflation is particularly strong during the periods when 
central bankers want to break the record of high inflation such as in the UK or in Australia at the 
beginning of 1980s and it becomes less aggressive in the low inflation environment with subdued 
shocks. Third, some central banks are also found to react to output gap developments with the 
estimated parameter to be slightly positive on average (see more detailed results in Baxa et al., 
2010). 
 
Finally, we perform a battery of robustness checks. First, following the argument put forward 
above, we use interbank interest rates as a dependent variable. These results are reported in 
Figures A.2.1-A.2.2. We can see that the overall stress effect on the interbank rate is larger for the 
US during the current crisis, where it explains 2 percent of the decrease of the interbank interest 
rate. For Sweden, we have found a strong positive effect of exchange rate volatility in the late 
1980s; this might be linked to the aim of the central bank to keep the exchange rate fixed. In 
other cases, there is no substantial difference between the benchmark results and results obtained 
using this alternative dependent variable.     
 
Second, in the benchmark model and all the results reported so far we use the first lag of the FSI 
in policy rule estimation. We stimulate this choice by the use of monthly data, the frequency of 
monetary policy meetings of most central bank boards and the assumption that the policy actions 
are likely to be implemented in a timely fashion. In addition, we employ different lags and leads, 
in the latter case allowing the policy to be preemptive rather than reactive. In this case, we use the 
future realized value of the FSI as a proxy of a central bank’s expectation (in a similar manner as 
to how it is routinely executed for inflation expectations) and consequently treat the FSI as an 
endogenous variable (see Figure A.3.1 for the results). In order to get comparable results, we 
calibrate the variance ratios by the same values as in the baseline specification. Although we find 
                                                                                       
18 The correlation coefficient of the estimated time-varying coefficient of a lagged interest rate ρ and the financial 
stress index δ is -0.79 for Australia, 0.21 for Canada, -0.20 for Sweden, -0.68 for the UK and 0.60 for the US 
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rather mixed evidence on preemptive policy actions, which can be also related to the inadequacy 
of proxying the expected values of financial stress by actual values of the financial stress indicator 
as well as the fact that a central bank might not react to the stress preemptively, the reaction to 
financial stress in the current crisis is strongly negative for both expected or observed stress.   
 
Third, we further break down the FSI sub-indices to each underlying variable to evaluate their 
individual contribution.19 The corresponding stress effects appear in Figures A.4.1-A.4.2. 
Breaking down stock-market related stress, we find that the US Fed and the BoC react to the 
corporate bond spread, whereas the BoE and Sveriges Riksbank are more concerned by stock 
returns and volatility. While the RBA seem to be concerned with both corporate bond spreads 
and stock market volatility in the 1980s, the role of stock-related stress had substantially 
decreased by then. As far as bank-related stress is concerned, the TED spread plays a major role 
in all countries apart from the UK where the largest proportion of the effect on the interest rate 
can be attributed to an inverted term structure. 
 
Fourth, since the verifications related to our econometric framework to obvious alternatives such 
as, first, the use of a maximum likelihood estimator via the Kalman filter instead of the moment-
based time-varying coefficient framework of Schlicht and, second, the use of a Markov-switching 
model instead of a state-space model were provided in Baxa et al. (2010), we estimate simple 
time-invariant monetary policy rules for each country by the generalized method of moments, 
including various subsamples. This simple evidence reaffirms that the analyzed central banks 
seem to pay attention to overall financial stress in the economy. The FSI is statistically significant, 
with a negative sign of a magnitude between 0.05-0.20 for all countries. On the other hand, the 
coefficient of its sub-components often are not, and the exchange rate subcomponent in some 
cases has a positive sign. These results, which are available upon request, confirm that to 
understand the interest rate adjustment to financial stress, one should rely on a model allowing a 
differential response across time.      
 
5 Concluding Remarks 
The 2008-2009 global financial crisis awoke a significant interest in exploring the interactions 
between monetary policy and financial stability. This paper aimed to examine in a systematic 
manner whether and how the monetary policy of selected main central banks (US Fed, the Bank 
                                                                                       
19 This applies only to the banking and the stock market sub-components because the foreign exchange sub-
component is represented by a single variable. 
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of England, Reserve Bank of Australia, Bank of Canada and Sveriges Riksbank) responded to 
episodes of financial stress over the last three decades. Instead of using individual alternative 
measures of financial stress in different markets, we employed the comprehensive indicator of 
financial stress recently developed by the International Monetary Fund, which tracks overall 
financial stress as well as its main subcomponents, in particular banking stress, stock market 
stress and exchange rate stress. 
 
Unlike a few existing empirical contributions that aim to evaluate the impact of financial stability 
concerns on monetary policymaking, we adopt a more flexible methodology that allows for the 
response to financial stress (and other macroeconomic variables) to change over time as well as 
deals with potential endogeneity (Kim and Nelson, 2006). The main advantage of this framework 
is that it does not only enable testing whether the central banks responded to financial stress at 
all, but it also detects the periods and types of stress that were the most worrying for monetary 
authorities. Our results indicate that central banks truly change their policy stance in the face of 
financial stress, but that the magnitude of such responses varies substantially over time. As 
expected, the impact of financial stress on interest rate setting is essentially zero most of the time 
when the levels of stress are very moderate. However, most central banks loosen monetary policy 
when the economy faces high financial stress. There is a certain cross-country and time 
heterogeneity when we look at central banks’ considerations of specific types of financial stress. 
While most central banks seem to respond to stock market stress and bank stress, exchange rate 
stress is found to drive the reaction of central banks only in more open economies 
 
Consistently with our expectations, the results indicate that a sizeable fraction of monetary policy 
easing during the 2008-2009 financial crisis can be explained by a direct response to the financial 
stress above what could be attributed to a decline in inflation expectation and output below its 
potential. Although, the size of the financial stress effect differs by country. The result suggests 
that all central banks, except the Bank of England, kept their policy rates at 50 basis points lower 
on average solely due to financial stress present in the economy. Interestingly, the size of this 
effect for the UK is assessed at about five times stronger (i.e. 250 basis points). This implies that 
about 50 percent of the overall policy rate decrease during the recent financial crisis was 
motivated by financial stability concerns in the UK (10-30 percent in the remaining sample 
countries), while the remaining half falls on unfavorable developments in domestic economic 
activity. For the US Fed, the macroeconomic developments themselves (a low-inflation 
environment and an output substantially below its potential) explain the major fraction of the 
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policy interest rate decreases during the crisis, leaving the further response to financial stress to 
be constrained by zero interest rate bound.  
 
All in all, our results point to the usefulness  of augmenting the standard version of monetary 
policy rule by some measure of financial conditions to get a better understanding of the interest 
rate setting process, especially when financial markets are not stable. The empirical results suggest 
that the main central banks considered in this study altered the course of their monetary policy in 
the face of financial stress. The recent crisis seems truly to be an exceptional period in the sense 
that the response to financial instability was substantial and coincided in all analyzed countries, 
which is evidently related to intentional policy coordination absent in previous decades. However, 
we have also seen that previous idiosyncratic episodes of financial distress were, at least in some 
countries, followed by monetary policy responses of similar if not higher magnitude. 
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Appendix 1 
Figure A.1.1 – Time-Varying Monetary Policy Rules: U.S. 
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Note: The estimated coefficients of time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% 
confidence interval. 
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Figure A.1.2 – Time-Varying Monetary Policy Rules: U.K. 
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Note: The estimated coefficients of time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% 
confidence interval. 
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Figure A.1.3 – Time-Varying Monetary Policy Rules: Sweden 
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Note: The estimated coefficients of time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% 
confidence interval. 
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Figure A.1.4 – Time-Varying Monetary Policy Rules: Australia 
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Note: The estimated coefficients of time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% 
confidence interval. 
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Figure A.1.5 – Time-Varying Monetary Policy Rules: Canada 
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Note: The estimated coefficients of time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% 
confidence interval. 
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Appendix 2  
The Results with the Interbank Rate as the Dependent Variable in the Policy Rule 
 
Figure  A2.1 – The Effect of Financial Stress on Interest Rate Setting 
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Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of the financial stress effect. The stress effect (y-axis) is 
defined as the product of the estimated coefficient on the financial stress indicator in monetary 
policy rule and the value of the IMF financial stress indicator. The stress effect shows the 
magnitude of the interest rate reaction to financial stress in percentage points. 
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Figure A2.2 – The Effect of Financial Stress Components on Interest Rate Setting: 
Bank Stress, Exchange Rate Stress and Stock Market Stress 
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Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of the components of the financial stress effect, namely 
bank stress effect, exchange rate stress effect and stock market stress effect. The stress effect (y-
axis) is defined as the product of the estimated coefficient on the given component of the 
financial stress indicator in monetary policy rule and the value of the corresponding component 
of the IMF financial stress indicator. The stress effect shows the magnitude of the interest rate 
reaction to financial stress in percentage points. 
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Appendix 3  
The Results with Different Leads and Lag of the FSI 
Figure  A3.1 – The Effect of Financial Stress (t-1 vs. t-2, t, t+1, t+2) on Interest Rate 
Setting 
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Appendix 4  
The Results with Individual Variables of Bank Stress and Stock Market Stress 
 
Figure  A4.1 – The Effect of Bank Stress on Interest Rate Setting 
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Figure  A4.2 – The Effect of Stock Market Stress on Interest Rate Setting 
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